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Abstract 
The Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the head of monetary policy in the country, 
primarily uses the Federal Open Market Committee, or FOMC, to make and communicate policy 
decisions. Since 1994 the FOMC has become ever more transparent. By releasing statements after 
each meeting they hold, releasing more detailed minutes of these meetings three weeks later, and 
releasing full transcripts of the meetings five years later, they are able to inform the public of their 
intentions and thoughts while withholding potentially volatile information for later release dates. 
These three documents reveal much about how the FOMC operates and what its members think. 
The goal of this research was to determine the sentiment in each of these documents from 2004 to 
2012, to examine how the sentiment in each of these documents differs, to identify significant 
factors or themes, and to use treasury market data to characterize these themes. We found that 
there was a divergence in private and public sentiment output by the FOMC, we found that treasury 
markets are more receptive to policy related themes than sentiment, and we characterized three 
significant themes based on their interaction with treasury market data. 
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I. Introduction 
This thesis seeks to answer four questions using sentiment analysis and regression 
techniques. First, what sentiment is reflected in statements, minutes, and transcripts released by 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Second, to what extent do privately expressed 
sentiments and opinions (in meeting transcripts) diverge from those expressed to the public (in 
meeting statements). Third, what are the themes (or factors) expressed in these same documents 
during the time period. Finally, what is the financial market reactions to sentiment and themes 
found in these Federal Reserve communications.  
The Federal Reserve serves many functions, from acting as a lender of last resort to banks 
short on liquidity, to setting monetary policy by adjusting interbank interest rates, or the federal 
funds rate, and acting as a supervisor of banking activities in the United States. The Federal 
Reserve has a dual mandate to maintain inflation at a target rate and to keep unemployment low. 
For many decades the Federal Reserve enacted policy largely in secret, sharing few details with 
the wider public. But with changing political and social climates the Fed released its first 
statement in 1994 following the February FOMC meeting. The FOMC is the committee 
comprised of (seven) Federal Reserve Governors and presidents of the twelve district Federal 
Reserve Bank presidents. The FOMC is the committee that sets monetary policy that the Federal 
Reserve enacts. It is led by a Chair, currently Jerome Powell, who serves a four-year renewable 
term. Statements released by the FOMC provide the public with information regarding monetary 
policy decisions and actions being taken by the Federal Reserve. These statements are released 
eight times a year immediately following FOMC meetings. In the two decades since the release 
of the first statement, the Fed has increased its communication with the public dramatically, from 
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holding press conferences following FOMC meetings, to releasing the minutes of their meetings 
(three weeks after a meeting) and indicating the voting pattern at each meeting.  
The style of FOMC communication has changed over the years to reflect this trend towards 
greater communication and transparency. The chairman at the beginning of our sample period, 
Alan Greenspan, was notorious for his lack of clarity. He is known to have said “if I turn out to 
be particularly clear, you’ve probably misunderstood what I’ve said.” (Norris,2002). His 
successor, Ben Bernanke, was a large proponent of the move to transparency, and this can be 
seen in how he affected the statement released after FOMC meetings. As seen in Fig. 1 the word 
count for statements increased over our period. It is difficult to say if Bernanke had the sole 
effect on this though as his leadership coincided with the Great Recession and the subsequent 
lengthening of statements in relation to new monetary policy actions, such as quantitative easing. 
Regardless there is a quantifiable move towards lengthier statements in the past 15 years. 
 
 
 
In the words of the current FOMC Chair, Jerome Powell, there are three purposes to the 
FOMC communications. First is “to provide the transparency that enables the Congress and the 
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public to hold the Committee accountable for its decisions on monetary policy”. Second is “to 
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy”, which results in a better-informed public who 
make economic decisions based on the FOMC’s views, which in turn makes monetary policy 
more effective. Third is “to show the full range of FOMC participants views, even if doing so 
may sometimes make it difficult for the public to identify a consensus view” (Powell, 2016). 
After each FOMC meeting three documents are released over the course of five years. The 
first and arguably most important document released is the FOMC statement. This includes the 
FOMC’s economic outlook, the policy action that the Federal Reserve is taking, and forward 
guidance. Forward guidance, explicitly used for the first time in August of 2003, is the tool that 
the FOMC uses to influence expectations regarding future actions that they might take. The 
second document to be released is the minutes of the meeting. This is released three weeks after 
the FOMC meeting which represents another evolution in Federal Reserve Communication. 
These evolutions can be seen in greater detail in Table 1. This document contains a brief 
overview of what was discussed during the meeting. Finally, the transcript of the meeting, which 
contains the conversations had during the meetings verbatim, is released five years after the 
meeting.  
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Table 1 
Chairman Date Change in Fed Communication 
Greenspan 
Feb 1994 – 
May 1999 
Began issuing statements at the end of FOMC 
meetings, but only if a change in policy occurred 
Since July 
1995 
Statement includes target for fed funds rate 
Since May 
1999  
Statement issued after every FOMC meeting 
Since Mar 
2002 
Statement includes vote details + explanation for 
dissents 
Since Aug 
2003 
First explicit forward-guidance language to the 
statement + the "considerable period" language 
Since Dec 
2004 
Expedited release of FOMC minutes, i.e. 3 
weeks after FOMC meeting 
Bernanke 
Since Oct 
2007 
Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) 
provided with FOMC statement 
Since Sep 
2010 
Minutes have included paragraphs that reflect the 
views on monetary policy expressed by all 
meeting participants, not just those who vote on 
the policy decision. 
Since April 
2011 
Chair has held a quarterly press conference 
following the FOMC meetings 
Since Jan 
2012 
the federal funds rate projections, or "dot plot" 
added as an addendum to meeting minutes 
Since Jan 
2012 
Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary 
Policy Strategy released after each FOMC 
meeting 
  
Greater frequency of speeches by key Fed 
officials 
  Greater transparency + diversity of viewpoints 
Source: Powell (2016) - The Modern Era 
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Our analysis in this paper is over all scheduled FOMC meetings from January 2004 to 
December 2012 (ignoring conference calls), for a total sample of seventy-two meetings. We 
decided to begin our sample in 2004 since starting in “mid-2003, the statements have indeed 
become more informative and their final form had been settled.” (Mazis and Tsekrekos, 2017). 
In addition to this, minutes began being released three weeks following meetings. We chose the 
end of our sample as 2012 since when we started this research we did not have access to all 
transcripts from 2013 meetings due to the five-year lag of release. Our sample is marked by the 
leadership of two Fed Chairman, Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke. Greenspan presided over 
the beginning of our sample until January 2006, or 17 meetings, while Bernanke was chair from 
February 2006 until the end of our sample, or 55 meetings.  
Overall, the sentiment, defined as positive, negative, or uncertain, of each of these three 
document types can be quantified and compared. The sentiment of these documents is important 
to study as it provides a quantifiable indication of what the FOMC was thinking in making each 
of its policy decisions. In addition, sentiment differences between documents can be calculated 
to see if the publicly expressed sentiments in the statements matches the sentiment expressed in 
private. This is important because it allows us to compare what was being said behind closed 
doors and what was purposefully being told to the public. Differences in private and public 
sentiment give us insight into if the FOMC was expressing a sentiment different than the one 
they held for potentially strategic purposes (though it cannot be definitively said if any difference 
in public and private sentiment was intentional or if it was simply by chance). 
Sentiment is defined by the frequency of words belonging to each sentiment grouping, i.e. 
positive, negative, or uncertain. A document’s sentiment is determined by which of the 
groupings has the highest frequency as a percent of total words. The sentiment varies over time 
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and across documents as different language is used to reflect different policy climates. Language 
may vary due to the changing opinions of FOMC members, or changes in the economy that 
require a different vocabulary to address, or deliberate word choices to evoke specific emotions 
from the readers of FOMC statements. 
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II. Literature Review 
Because of this increase in communications and transparency increasingly research is being 
conducted into how exactly the Federal Reserve communicates and the impact that 
communications have on financial markets. A prime example of what is perhaps the earliest 
textual analysis of the FOMC can be found in Boukus and Rosenberg (2006). They utilized latent 
semantic analysis which is “a language processing technique that allows recognition of the 
textual associative patterns in documents” to determine how the content of FOMC minutes have 
changed and how they affect markets. They applied Latent semantic analysis to FOMC minutes 
from January 1987 to December 2005. It was found that treasury yield changes were dependent 
on the themes expressed in the minutes as well as the level of uncertainty expressed. They 
described these themes based on key words that appear within them but were never specifically 
named or characterized. Ultimately, they determined that this indicates that market watchers can 
fully understand the minutes and draw sophisticated conclusions based on the general themes. 
This research acts as the basis for all future FOMC textual analysis. 
Mazis and Tsekrekos (2017) analyzed FOMC statements to find textual associative patterns 
and examine their impact on the treasury market in a similar way to the research conducted in 
this paper. They utilized latent semantic analysis and essentially found the themes, or groupings 
of statistically significant words based on use and effect, of the statements. They then compared 
these themes to treasury market reaction (specifically daily changes in treasury yields) through a 
time series regression. (This regression utilized these daily changes in treasury yields as the 
dependent variable and had the themes found in those documents as the independent variables.) 
They found that the themes had a statistically significant effect on the yield of treasury bonds.  
Different themes related to changes in different yield curves, such as Theme 1 relating to the 
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long end of the yield curve and the credit spread, while Theme 3 related to only the long end of 
the yield curve, and Theme 6 related to the short end of the yield curve. This indicated that 
different themes had different meanings that the public picked up on in reading FOMC 
statements. 
Jubinski and Tomljanovich (2016) examined the effect of the release of FOMC statements 
and minutes on equity return and volatility series. When looking at the FOMC statements and 
minutes they only viewed release time and the immediate effects the releases had on the market. 
They did not view the content of the statement in depth and instead were comparing the severity 
of the change in stock price after the release of the statement to the severity of the change in 
stock price after the release of the minutes. Ultimately, they found that returns do not change 
much after releases, but conditional volatility rises. Also, they noted that high trading frequency 
firms responded much more to these FOMC statements and minutes than their lower frequency 
counterparts (though the study does not specify specific high and low trading intensity firms). 
 There is a strong correlation between the sentiment content of FOMC documents and the 
movement of interest rates. They determined this using max-entropy discrimination latent 
Dirichlet allocation models to show that FOMC documents affect short and long-term interest 
rates. This can be seen in Rohlfs et al (2016) where they found that applying the aforementioned 
Dirichlet model to FOMC statements they were able to predict what the Federal Funds Target 
Rate would be in the future with 93% accuracy. 
 This type of research is not limited to the Federal Reserve and the FOMC though, as 
research on the Brazilian Central Bank demonstrates (Montes and Nicolay, 2017). Their research 
examined the effect that clarity, defined as the “quality of information provided and the capacity 
of comprehension the public has reading what central bank communicates”, within central 
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banking had on perceived credibility. Credibility in this case is defined as the difference between 
expected inflation and the target inflation of the Brazilian Central Bank. They found that higher 
level of clarity increased credibility but only if the central bank and its leader are dedicated to 
inflation control as their primary objective, something that cannot be unequivocally said of the 
Federal Reserve as the dual mandate exists. 
Kahveci and Odabas (2016) applied text mining and sentiment analysis the monetary 
policy texts from the Fed, ECB, and Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey from 2002 to 2015. 
Generally, they found that for the Fed, optimism declined over the period, while certainty 
increased. For the ECB they found that there was little change in tone over the period. For the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey optimism has been increasing in recent years while 
certainty stayed relatively constant. The results regarding Fed optimism defied conventional 
wisdom, which dictates that more optimism in Fed communications would improve market 
expectations of the economy and future Fed actions. They found that market expectations 
actually declined as Fed optimism increased. Based on this finding the authors pose the question 
of whether the Fed could have mitigated some of the damage of the recession by using more 
optimistic language. Overall, they conclude that transparency and a decline in optimism from the 
Fed could have negatively impacted the US’s recovery from the recession. 
 Overall, there is a rich literature on textual analysis of financial documents. Most 
researchers utilize advanced programming languages and incorporate textual analysis 
subroutines that can process an incredible amount of text in a very short time span. Shen (2018) 
conducts sentiment analysis of financial tweets and market data to study how financial tweets 
(specifically including mention of the company Apple) affect stock market changes. It contains a 
great bit of information on sentiment analysis, mainly that in performing sentiment analysis one 
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can either focus on a) words, which is based on frequency and sentiment value which comes 
from a dictionary, b) sentences, which focuses on sentences using the sentiment values of words 
to come up with a sentence score, or c) the whole documents. The author stresses that taking the 
whole document approach only works for analyzing short documents like tweets. For this reason, 
we apply a process which analyzes sentiment word by word. The study also includes information 
on sorting stock market data using a Python add on, called Python Data Analysis Library, which 
is a commonly used program for sorting data information according to the author. The findings 
of the study showed that there is a significant correlation between the sentiment expressed in 
financial tweets and stock market movements.  
 Ernst, Ekkehard and Merola (2018) covered how FOMC member’s speeches matched the 
actions of the Federal Reserve. Their research examined speeches given by central bank 
members from the 1997 to 2016 to determine if the intensity, a scale from zero to one hundred 
based on the appearance of certain keywords, in the speeches is matched in the intensity of the 
banks’ actions. To do this they developed a data mining routine in the R programming language. 
This routine analyzes the content of the speeches by searching for predefined words. It then 
determines intensity for five different areas, i.e. monetary conditions, financial stability, external 
competitiveness, labor and social conditions, and economic activity. They found that when 
speech intensity is matched in monetary policy decisions, such as the level of which to change 
interest rates there is less reliance on traditional monetary policy tools. 
 With all this research there is still a gap in the research, i.e. no one has combined the idea 
of analyzing the sentiment of FOMC statements, minutes, and transcripts and comparing that to 
immediate market reactions to determine if the disparity in sentiment correlates to these market 
reactions, and then also conducting a factor analysis to determine themes and their effect on 
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market data. Jubinski’s and Tomljanovich (2016) merely examined the effects of the simple 
release of statements and minutes on treasury bonds. Mazis and Tsekrekos (2017) lay a strong 
foundation for the research detailed in this paper. Montes and Nicolay (2017) provided excellent 
information regarding the methods for analyzing communications, but their findings are limited 
to Brazil. Overall, there is a large literature in the field of Federal Reserve communications such 
as research on the importance of FOMC minutes (Nechio and Wilson, 2016), or research into 
how the public perceives Fed communications (Olson and Wessel, 2017), or regarding the need 
for transparency in Fed communications (Yellen, 2012). Despite this wealth of research there is 
still a gap regarding the comparison of the sentiment of transcript, minutes, and statements and 
their effect on asset markets, and the difference between private and public sentiment. 
 A key component to performing any textual analysis is having a dictionary to run the 
software with. The dictionary defines the sentiment for a given list of words, such as positive, 
negative, or uncertain among many others. A great difficulty with performing a textual analysis 
is making sure that words have the correct sentiment associated with them within the dictionary. 
There are many different dictionaries available such as the Harvard IV-4, a very popular and 
heavily used dictionary. For the purposes of analyzing FOMC documents though one dictionary 
is best suited, the Loughran-McDonald dictionary.  The Loughran – McDonald dictionary is 
discussed in Loughran and McDonald (2011). They did a study on the Harvard IV-4 dictionary 
and found that it lacked the context necessary to perform accurate analysis for finance, as a lot of 
words that were considered negative are either positive or neutral industry specific words in a 
finance context. They studied over fifty thousand 10-Ks and from their findings of how the 
Harvard IV-4 dictionary performed created their own sentiment dictionary. One inherent flaw in 
any textual analysis that they recognize is the fact that many words are polysemes, which means 
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they have multiple meanings. This makes the creation of a definitive categorization of a word 
challenging, as one meaning could be positive and one could be negative. Besides the positive 
and negative categories, Loughran and McDonald created categories for uncertainty, litigious, 
strong modal, and weak modal words. These categories have been shown to have a significant 
impact on the ability to gauge tone. The uncertainty dictionary focuses on words that denote 
imprecision. The litigious dictionary focuses on words that denote questions of legality or legal 
contest. The modal dictionaries are dictionaries that include other words for levels of 
confidences. Strong includes words such as ‘always’, ‘highest’, etc. Whereas weak includes 
words such as ‘could’, ‘depending’, etc.  
 Besides the issues of polysemes present in all dictionaries, the Loughran McDonald 
dictionary has difficulty with processing naturalistic language, or more common everyday 
language not particularly present in the more technical and professional 10-K’s that the 
Loughran-McDonald dictionary is based on. Such language includes words like ‘interesting’ or 
‘insightful’ among others. Cannon (2015) noted in her research of how FOMC sentiment leads 
economic activity that the Loughran-McDonald dictionary misses some nuance of the speech 
patterns contained in FOMC transcripts, but that its financial specialization still makes it the best 
option. 
Despite its flaws there is a general acceptance of the Loughran-McDonald dictionary. For 
instance, Mangee (2018) confirmed that the contextualized Loughran-McDonald dictionary is 
best suited to performing any sort of sentiment analysis on financial texts, especially when 
adding in market reactions to the mix. Mangee compared the Loughran McDonald dictionary to 
the Harvard IV-4 dictionary. He concluded through rigorous testing of both dictionaries on Wall 
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Street Journal articles and end of day summary reports that the context specific Loughran 
McDonald dictionary performed better at providing accurate analysis results. 
Another prime instance of the dictionaries use is Kan Chen’s research into FOMC 
statements. Chen’s research examines FOMC statements using textual analysis. He decided to 
use the Loughran-McDonald dictionary using the positive, negative, and uncertain dictionaries. 
He claims that around the recession of 2008-2009, the FOMC used significantly more positive 
language as defined by the Loughran-McDonald dictionary in an attempt to boost market 
confidence. Similarly, negative words were used most frequently around 2008 when quantitative 
easing began and have slowly tapered off in use in recent years. Uncertainty peaked before the 
recession demonstrating that it might be a good indicator for bad economic situations. Also, 
Chen found a positive correlation between the sentiment and stock volatility indicators such as 
VIX, suggesting that stock markets are sensitive to negative sentiment (Chen, 2016). 
Similarly, Kahveci and Odabas (2016) utilized two dictionaries from their software of 
choice, Diction 7. These two dictionaries were optimism and certainty. They defined optimism as 
“language endorsing some person, group, concept or event, or highlighting their positive 
entailments”.  They define certainty as language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and 
completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra. This use of a dictionary of positive words and 
a dictionary of certain (or uncertain) words matches well with the type of dictionaries created by 
Loughran and McDonald. 
An important paper in this field that influenced how we thought about using dictionaries 
was Jegadeesh and Wu (2017). They combined the Loughran-McDonald and Harvard IV-4 
dictionaries to run their sentiment analysis on FOMC minutes. This allows for both financially 
specific words to be accounted for as well as more naturalistic words. Similar to other studies in 
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this field they used a latent Dirichlet allocation algorithm to determine the topics discussed in 
each paragraph of the minutes in their sample. They combined these topics with sentiment data 
and examined the reaction of stock markets and interest rates. They found that positive 
statements regarding economic easing in minutes relate to positive trends in stock markets and 
interest rates going down. Overall, Jegadeesh and Wu contributed to the idea of combining 
sentiment dictionaries and using it to examine stock market reaction.  
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III. Methodology 
The following sections detail the steps taken to run sentiment, factor, and regression analysis. 
These three analyses create the backbone of this study and allow for an in depth look into FOMC 
communications. 
 
III.A. Sentiment Analysis 
1. To begin the process of textual analysis the documents that were analyzed had to be collected 
and put into the correct format. All statements, minutes, and transcripts for our study are 
public information and can be found on the Federal Reserve’s website. The documents had to 
be put into pdf form as the program of choice, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC), 
can only perform sentiment analysis on pdfs.  
2. With the documents ready the next step needed for the sentiment analysis was the choice of a 
dictionary. As discussed previously, the best dictionary for the purpose of analyzing FOMC 
texts is a combination of the Loughran McDonald dictionary for its financial context and the 
Harvard IV-4 dictionary for its ability to analyze naturalistic speech. These dictionaries are 
all readily available online. For LIWC, the dictionaries had to all be combined into one single 
excel document and subsequently saved as a .dic file type, the standard dictionary file type. 
3. Running the LIWC textual analysis software was simply a matter of uploading the combined 
Loughran McDonald and Harvard IV-4 dictionary file and running the textual analysis on 
every statement, minute, and transcript. The output, which will be discussed in greater detail 
in the results section, was then transferred to an excel spreadsheet from which calculations 
were performed, such as finding, mean sentiments, calculating the differences in sentiment 
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between statements, minutes, and transcripts, and graphing sentiment over years for each of 
the document types. 
 
III.B. Factor Analysis 
 Factor analysis is a statistical process which groups variables together into statistically 
significant groups. This creates new variables or factors, which are the groupings of existing 
variables. In our case these factors are groupings of words that we call themes that can be 
characterized based on their appearance in statements and minutes and how they relate to 
changes in treasury yields. 
1. To run factor analysis, we took the top 100 most frequently occurring words from the FOMC 
statements and added them to the existing dictionary (Loughran-McDonald and Harvard IV-
4). This allowed for the factor analysis to capture words that may not have a predefined 
sentiment but were important monetary policy words for statements to include. These words 
included inflation, housing, mandate, employment, etc. Once added, the combined dictionary 
was reformatted to become self-referential. This newly formatted dictionary was run through 
LIWC. From there the top 100 most frequent words were selected and became its own 
dictionary. This was then run through LIWC one more time and the results were factor 
analyzed in the program SPSS.  
2. Before the factor analysis could be run it had to be determined if the data set met two specific 
criteria, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (KMO) and the Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity. The KMO for the dictionary was found to be 0.8. A score of higher than 
0.6 is considered optimal. Similarly, Bartlett’s test of sphericity indicated that the data was 
significant and was therefore a good candidate for exploratory factor analysis. 
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3.  Running an exploratory factor analysis with varimax and 7 groupings based on the elbow 
test, which is determining the number of factors to be used based on the inflection point of 
the scree plot of eigenvalues and factor numbers.  
4. The seven factors were then put into a new dictionary. This dictionary was run through 
LIWC to determine how these factors varied over time.  
 
III C. Regression Analysis 
To determine what these factors mean and how they, as well as sentiment, relate to 
market data we had to perform a regression analysis. Our regression analysis was based on four 
different interest rate measures, i.e. the two-year treasury yield (T2Y), the ten-year treasury yield 
(T10Y), a measure of the slope of the treasury yield curve (T10Y2Y), and a measure of the credit 
spread (BAA10Y). The slope of the yield curve can be measured by the difference in long-term 
and short-term yields. We use the difference between the ten-year Treasury yield and two-year 
treasury yield (T10Y2Y). The credit spread is the difference between low quality bond yields 
and high-quality bond yields. We use the difference between BAA bond yields and 10-year 
Treasury yields (BAA10Y) to measure changes in the credit spread. All asset market data is from 
FRED. 
These interest rate metrics were chosen to help shed light on the nature of the themes 
embedded in FOMC documents. The 3 month and two-year treasuries are shorter term and are 
very sensitive to FOMC actions. The ten-year treasury is longer term and is sensitive to inflation 
expectations and global economic conditions. The credit spread tends to widen in recessionary 
(or weak economic) times and narrow in expansionary (or strong economic) times. 
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We ran four different types of regressions. First was a regression of the changes in yields 
on the factors identified in our factor analysis. This model took the following form: 
1. ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹1𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑁𝐹𝑁𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡𝑋𝑡
′ + 𝜀𝑡 
where ∆𝑦𝑡 is the difference in end of day yields between the day before and day of release of 
FOMC statements. 𝛼 is the regression constant. 𝐹1𝑡 … 𝐹𝑁𝑡 are factors one through seven and the 
β’s are their coefficients. 𝑋𝑡
′ is vector of control variables for the pre- and post-crisis (ie. Pre-
Dec.2007 and post-Dec.2007), quantitative easing periods (i.e. December 2008 to March 2010, 
November 2010 to June 2011, and September 2012 to the end of the sample) and FOMC 
meetings at which a policy change occurred (i.e. raising or lowering rates, which occurred at 27 
meetings between the beginning of the sample to December 2008, the beginning of QE). These 
controls were coded as dummy variables of 0 for pre-crisis, and 1 for post crisis; 0 for non-
quantitative easing, and 1 for quantitative easing; and, 0 for no policy change (i.e. a raising or 
lowering of federal funds rate), and 1 for a policy change. 
The second was a regression of the changes in treasury yields on the factors identified in 
our factor analysis, but instead of being on the difference in yields based on statement releases it 
is based on minutes release dates. It took the same form as (1). 
The third was a regression of the changes in treasury yields on positive, negative, and 
uncertain sentiment of statements. It took the form: 
2. ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆
+ + 𝛽2𝑆
− + 𝛽3𝑆
𝑈 + 𝛾𝑡𝑋𝑡
′ + 𝜀𝑡 
where all variables are the same as previously defined, except 𝑆+, 𝑆−, 𝑆𝑈 are the sentiments 
expressed in each FOMC statement. 
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 The final regression was of the absolute difference of sentiment between minutes and 
statements. This is done to determine how the difference in sentiment between the carefully 
crafted statement and the more detailed minutes affect the treasury markets. It took the form: 
3. ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1|𝑀 − 𝑆|
+ + 𝛽2|𝑀 − 𝑆|
− + 𝛽3|𝑀 − 𝑆|
𝑢 + 𝛾𝑡𝑋𝑡
′ + 𝜀𝑡 
with |𝑀 − 𝑆|+, |𝑀 − 𝑆|−, |𝑀 − 𝑆|𝑢 being the absolute difference in positive, negative and 
uncertain sentiment, and the change in yield being centered around the minutes release date. 
 These models were run through SPSS using stepwise regressions with backwards 
elimination. The regression coefficients obtained from this process were then used to 
characterize the factors obtained through the factor analysis process, which is discussed in 
greater depth in the results and conclusion sections. 
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IV. Empirical Results 
The following sections provides the results from each of the previously described analyses, 
sentiment analysis, factor analysis, and regression analysis. These take the form of sections 
detailing sentiment analysis results, the difference between private and public sentiment, and 
factor analysis results. 
 
IV A. Sentiment Analysis Results 
The first set of results comes from the sentiment analysis of statements, minutes, and 
transcripts. It can be seen in Fig. 2 that negative sentiment peaked during the beginning of the 
recession and then decreased over the courrse of the remainder of the recession. Conversely, 
positive sentiment increased during the recession. This makes sense as economic conditions 
improved so too would the sentiment in statements similar to the findings of  Cannon (2015). An 
important note is how uncertainty decreases over the sample period. This agrees with the 
findings of Kahveci and Odabas (2016). This could potentially be attributed to changes in 
chairman style. Unfortunately we cannot definitively say that as the recession in the middle of 
the sample limits our ability to make solid conclusions about chairman style, but it is still an 
important element of the results. Regardless, the decrease in uncertainty means that the FOMC 
was more clearly positive or negative following the recession and conveyed their sentiment more 
effectively. 
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The results from minutes and transcripts in Figs. 3 and 4 tell a similar story. Perhaps of 
more interest is the correlation between the sentiments of the document types as seen in Tables 2, 
3, and 4. We would generally expect a positive correlation between all documents for a given 
meeting if they are conveying the same sentiment. Table 2 shows us that on average for the 
whole period the sentiment in statements, minutes, and transcripts was positive correlated. Table 
3 and 4 break this down by pre-crisis and post-crisis. Of most note in Table 3 is the correlation 
between positive sentiment between statements and transcripts pre-2007 and the correlation 
between uncertain sentiment between statements and minutes pre-2007 (the highlighted cells in 
Table 3). What the negative correlation between the statement and transcript prior to the crisis 
could suggest is that there is a divergence between the privately expressed sentiment (in 
statements) and the publicly expressed sentiment (in transcripts). In particular, we find that the 
Fed was more positive in private in the pre-crisis period, and less positive in private in the post-
crisis period relative to the sentiment expressed in public statements. Table 4 shows that there 
was only positive correlation between the sentiment of each document type indicating that the 
divergence was limited to pre-crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Average Sentiment Scores 2004-2012; N=72 
  Positive Negative Uncertain 
Statements 4.74 4.62 1.68 
Minutes 4.34 4.34 1.65 
Transcripts 4.8 4.59 1.74 
Correlation between raw sentiment scores 
  SM ST MT 
Positive Sentiment -0.16 0.30 -0.09 
Negative Sentiment 0.28 0.50 0.59 
Uncertain Sentiment 0.26 0.59 0.58 
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Table 3 
Average Sentiment Scores Pre 12/07 
  Positive Negative Uncertain 
Statements 4.00 4.18 2.26 
Minutes 4.75 4.36 1.83 
Transcripts 4.71 4.45 1.86 
Correlation between raw sentiment scores 
  SM ST MT 
Positive Sentiment 0.41 -0.22 0.08 
Negative Sentiment 0.40 0.31 0.48 
Uncertain Sentiment -0.23 0.29 0.33 
 
Table 4 
Average Sentiment Scores Post 12/07 
  Positive Negative Uncertain 
Statements 5.30 4.96 1.23 
Minutes 4.03 4.33 1.51 
Transcripts 4.87 4.69 1.65 
Correlation between raw sentiment scores 
  SM ST MT 
Positive Sentiment 0.12 0.51 0.20 
Negative Sentiment 0.23 0.46 0.71 
Uncertain Sentiment 0.37 0.46 0.53 
 
IV B. Public versus Private Sentiment 
Fig. 5 highlights the difference in sentiment between the transcripts and statements in our 
sample. A positive difference in Fig. 5 (any value above the solid black line) indicates that the 
public statement is less positive than the private transcript and any negative value (any value 
below the black line) indicates that the public statements is more positive than the private 
transcript. This would suggest that over the recession the FOMC wanted to put out a positive 
outlook by using positive words, while internally they were less positive and more negative (as 
seen in Fig. 6). This means that the FOMC deliberately expressed a different sentiment to the 
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public than they personally felt. Finally, we note that transcripts transitioned to being more 
uncertain than statements over the period. This corroborates the results seen earlier that 
uncertainty in statements declined over the period. This means that the FOMC wanted to be more 
clearly positive or negative in their public statements. 
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IV C. Factor Analysis 
 The process of factor analysis yielded seven factors of varying length seen in Table 5. 
These factors were analyzed in the context of statements, minutes, and transcripts over our 
sample. These results can be seen in Fig. 8, 9, and 10. These represent the total percentage of 
words from the statements, minutes, and transcripts that are part of each of the factors. From this 
we can see that factor one makes up a significant portion of the words in the statements, with a 
peak of twenty-six percent of words in the May 2007. Factor one obviously accounts for more of 
each document type than any other factor due to its large size, with thirty-four words compared 
to factor seven’s three. What is more meaningful is how the appearance of each factor over time 
relates to market data.  
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Table 5 
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 
vice consistent markets maintain point prices downside 
fomc mandate financial underlying basis energy may 
inflation holdings credit support period board activity 
target recovery promote stability approved increase  
voting unemployment conditions year action needed  
moderate levels reserve low percent risk  
keep securities economic price   sustainable  
today employment lower continues      
decided run developments pace      
pressures since remain        
funds help time        
chairman investment purchases        
policy longer-term spending        
information committee          
utilization range          
likely over          
resource continue          
monetary agency          
growth appropriate          
open expectations          
quarters            
housing            
outlook            
could            
federal            
risks            
ongoing            
remains            
elevated            
real            
market            
rate            
recent            
although            
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Regression analysis was run on four different yields, the change in the two-year treasury 
(T2Y), the change in the ten-year treasury (T10Y), the change in the yield curve (T10Y2Y), and 
the change in the credit spread (BAA10Y). The yield curve shows the relationship between 
short- and long-term interest rates. Short rates (T2Y) are very sensitive to FOMC actions, while 
long rates (T10Y) are sensitive to inflation expectations and global economic conditions.  
A sample of Treasury yield curves on June 15th of 2004, 2007, 2009 and 2012 can be 
seen in Fig. 11. These curves demonstrate what can be gleaned from yield curves. The flatter 
yield curve for 2007 portends a recession, whereas the steeper yield curve for 2009 appears to 
predict the emergence from a recession.  
 
The credit spread (BAA10Y) is another important factor we used for our regression 
analysis. In Fig. 12, the credit spread shows the relationship between low- and high-quality debt. 
The spread widens in recessions (indicated by grey bars) and narrows in expansions. 
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With this understood, the results seen in Table 6 show us the results from running model 
1 on statements. These results indicate that Factor 1 has a positive effect on the slope of the yield 
curve (T10Y2Y). The results also show us that Factor 2 has a positive effect on the slope of the 
yield curve (T10Y2Y). This would indicate that Factor 1 and Factor 2 are related to improving 
economic conditions as a steepening yield curve is associated with improved economic 
conditions as discussed earlier. Also, we can see that Factor 3 has a positive effect on the short-
term yield (T2Y) as well as a positive effect on the yield curve change (T10Y2Y). This would 
suggest that Factor 3 steepens the yield curve and deals with increasing short-term yields, 
meaning factor 3 most probably relates to Fed interest rate policy changes. 
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Table 6 
Model 1 based on Statements 
Coefficient Δ T2Y ΔT10Y ΔT10Y2Y ΔBAA10Y 
Intercept 0.012 0.253 -0.264** 0.099 
(Standard Error) 0.126 0.165 0.113 0.086 
Factor 1 0.000 0.008 0.008** -0.003 
(Standard Error) 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.003 
Factor 2 0.005 0.006 0.010* -0.002 
(Standard Error) 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.004 
Factor 3 0.014* 0.002 0.016** 0.000 
(Standard Error) 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.006 
Factor 4 0.003 0.013 0.010 -0.001 
(Standard Error) 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.007 
Factor 5 0.009 0.013 0.003 -0.006 
(Standard Error) 0.019 0.024 0.017 0.013 
Factor 6 0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.003 
(Standard Error) 0.014 0.018 0.013 0.010 
Factor 7 0.039 0.070 0.031 0.038*** 
(Standard Error) 0.035 0.046 0.032 0.024 
Crisis 0.067 0.007 -0.060 -0.010 
(Standard Error) 0.052 0.068 0.047 0.036 
QE 0.001 0.042 0.041 -0.005 
(Standard Error) 0.030 0.040 0.027 0.021 
Policy Change 0.035 0.004 0.031 -0.011 
(Standard Error) 0.058 0.076 0.052 0.040 
*** significant at 1%     ** significant at 5%    * significant at 10% 
 
Table 7 shows us the results from running model 1 on minutes. From these results we can 
see that Factor 1 again has a positive effect on the yield curve slope (T10Y2Y). This would 
indicate that Factor 1 steepens the yield curve like Factor 3 but does not affect the short-term 
yield curve meaning it relates more to economic conditions than Fed policy. Factor 1 has a 
significant positive effect on the slope of the yield curve for both the release of statements as 
well as the release of minutes, unlike Factor 2 which only has a statistically significant effect on 
the slope of the yield curve for the release of statements. This might suggest that Factor 1 still 
deals with economic conditions, but perhaps with greater specificity which the minutes would 
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allow. It should be noted that these results are significant despite the positive effect of 
quantitative easing on the slope of the yield curve. 
Table 7 
Model 1 based on Minutes 
Coefficient T2Y T10Y T10Y2Y BAA10Y 
Intercept 0.035 0.138 -0.172 -0.070 
(Standard Error) 0.108 0.121 0.088 0.061 
Factor 1 0.009 0.018 0.027** 0.004 
(Standard Error) 0.013 0.014 0.010 0.007 
Factor 2 0.011 0.028 0.017 -0.002 
(Standard Error) 0.019 0.022 0.016 0.011 
Factor 3 0.014 0.003 0.011 0.018 
(Standard Error) 0.021 0.024 0.017 0.012 
Factor 4 0.021 0.029 -0.009 -0.004 
(Standard Error) 0.032 0.035 0.026 0.018 
Factor 5 0.039 0.063 -0.025 0.038 
(Standard Error) 0.052 0.058 0.042 0.029 
Factor 6 0.034 0.013 -0.021 0.023 
(Standard Error) 0.033 0.036 0.026 0.018 
Factor 7 0.055 0.043 -0.012 -0.044 
(Standard Error) 0.053 0.059 0.043 0.029 
Crisis 0.013 0.017 -0.029 -0.009 
(Standard Error) 0.032 0.036 0.026 0.018 
QE 0.013 0.047 0.035*** 0.020 
(Standard Error) 0.018 0.021 0.015 0.010 
Policy Change 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.021 
(Standard Error) 0.019 0.022 0.016 0.011 
*** significant at 1%     ** significant at 5%    * significant at 10% 
 
Tables 8 and 9 show the results from running models 3 and 4. Nothing was found to be 
significant within these regressions meaning sentiment does not have any effect on treasury 
markets. 
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Table 8 
Model 2 
Coefficient T2Y T10Y T10Y2Y BAA10Y 
Intercept 0.171 0.222 -0.052 0.106 
(Standard Error) 0.093 0.120 0.086 0.063 
Positive 0.013 0.012 -0.001 -0.005 
(Standard Error) 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.006 
Negative 0.008 0.020 0.013 -0.009 
(Standard Error) 0.010 0.013 0.009 0.007 
Uncertain 0.029 0.029 0.000 -0.012 
(Standard Error) 0.019 0.024 0.017 0.013 
Crisis 0.019 0.003 -0.016 -0.005 
(Standard Error) 0.036 0.046 0.033 0.024 
QE 0.012 0.030 0.042 0.003 
(Standard Error) 0.029 0.037 0.026 0.019 
Policy Change 0.039 0.035 -0.004 -0.028 
(Standard Error) 0.030 0.039 0.028 0.021 
*** significant at 1%   ** significant at 5%  * significant at 10% 
 
Table 9 
Model 3 
Coefficient T2Y T10Y T10Y2Y BAA10Y 
Intercept 0.013 0.005 0.008 0.016 
(Standard Error) 0.020 0.023 0.017 0.012 
Positive 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.000 
(Standard Error) 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.005 
Negative 0.007 0.009 -0.016 -0.007 
(Standard Error) 0.012 0.013 0.010 0.007 
Uncertain 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.000 
(Standard Error) 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.006 
Crisis 0.005 0.008 -0.014 0.002 
(Standard Error) 0.019 0.021 0.016 0.011 
QE 0.011 0.023 0.011 0.025** 
(Standard Error) 0.018 0.020 0.015 0.010 
Policy Change 0.004 0.001 -0.004 -0.008 
(Standard Error) 0.017 0.019 0.014 0.009 
*** significant at 1%   ** significant at 5%  * significant at 10% 
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 Overall, the regression analysis has shown that out of the seven factors developed during 
the factor analysis three of them, factors 1,2 and 3 can be characterized by their relationship to 
changes in treasury yields around the release of FOMC statements and minutes. These 
characterizations are summarized in the Table 10. Ultimately, these characterizations, coupled 
with the zero effect of sentiment on treasury yields, would suggest that markets are more focused 
on the significant policy related words (factors) than the overall sentiment created by the word 
choice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Factor Characterizations 
Factor 1 Improving Economic Conditions 
with greater specificity 
Factor 2 Improving Economic Conditions 
Factor 3 Easing of Monetary Policy 
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V. Conclusions, Limitations, and Continuations 
 Overall, we conclude that sentiment varied over the sample period. Uncertainty 
decreased, perhaps as a result of change in leadership style, but at the very least as a result of the 
move to transparency. We conclude that over the course of the recession the FOMC began 
publicly expressing a more positive sentiment than they were privately expressing during 
meetings. And we conclude that sentiment holds no effect on changes in treasury yields, but that 
factors, specifically factors 1,2, ad 3, do and therefore can be characterized by their effect.  
 Despite these conclusions there are still limitations to this study. First is the dictionary 
that was used. Though a combination of dictionaries allowed us to get more accurate results than 
simply using one there are still words not being categorized and slipping through the sentiment 
analysis procedure. Finally, there could be other variables influencing the change in treasury 
yields besides the factors we analyzed.  
 There are a number of extensions that could stem from this study. One of those would be 
the creation of a specific sentiment dictionary for monetary policy. Just as Loughran and 
McDonald created a finance specific dictionary, a monetary policy specific dictionary would 
contribute immensely to the field. Another extension would be analyzing the effect of leadership 
style, such as Alan Greenspan’s vagueness and Ben Bernanke’s transparency. Another extension 
would be to take the divergence of private and public sentiments found in this study and 
determine if this was done for strategic purposes or not. Finally, another extension would be to 
look into how voting patterns correlate with sentiment changes between meetings, an issue we do 
not consider in this paper. 
 Overall despite its flaws, this research contributes to the literature in novel ways. First by 
analyzing sentiment in all document types. Second by comparing the sentiment of statements and 
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transcripts to understand how sentiment varies between public and private documents. Finally, 
by creating significant factors and characterizing them based on how they relate to the change in 
treasury yields around statement and minute releases.  
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Appendix 
January 28, 2004 Statement 
For immediate release 
The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to keep its target for the federal funds 
rate at 1 percent. 
The Committee continues to believe that an accommodative stance of monetary policy, 
coupled with robust underlying growth in productivity, is providing important ongoing 
support to economic activity. The evidence accumulated over the intermeeting period 
confirms that output is expanding briskly. Although new hiring remains subdued, other 
indicators suggest an improvement in the labor market. Increases in core consumer prices 
are muted and expected to remain low. 
The Committee perceives that the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable 
growth for the next few quarters are roughly equal. The probability of an unwelcome fall in 
inflation has diminished in recent months and now appears almost equal to that of a rise in 
inflation. With inflation quite low and resource use slack, the Committee believes that it can 
be patient in removing its policy accommodation. 
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Alan Greenspan, Chairman; Timothy F. 
Geithner, Vice Chairman; Ben S. Bernanke; Susan S. Bies; Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.; Edward 
M. Gramlich; Thomas M. Hoenig; Donald L. Kohn; Cathy E. Minehan; Mark W. Olson; 
Sandra Pianalto; and William Poole. 
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December 12, 2012 Statement 
For Immediate Release 
Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in October suggests that 
economic activity and employment have continued to expand at a moderate pace in recent 
months, apart from weather-related disruptions. Although the unemployment rate has declined 
somewhat since the summer, it remains elevated. Household spending has continued to advance, 
and the housing sector has shown further signs of improvement, but growth in business fixed 
investment has slowed. Inflation has been running somewhat below the Committee’s longer-run 
objective, apart from temporary variations that largely reflect fluctuations in energy prices. 
Longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable. 
Consistent with its statutory mandate, the Committee seeks to foster maximum employment and 
price stability. The Committee remains concerned that, without sufficient policy accommodation, 
economic growth might not be strong enough to generate sustained improvement in labor market 
conditions. Furthermore, strains in global financial markets continue to pose significant 
downside risks to the economic outlook. The Committee also anticipates that inflation over the 
medium term likely will run at or below its 2 percent objective. 
To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the 
rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee will continue purchasing additional 
agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month. The Committee also will 
purchase longer-term Treasury securities after its program to extend the average maturity of its 
holdings of Treasury securities is completed at the end of the year, initially at a pace of $45 
billion per month. The Committee is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal 
payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency 
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mortgage-backed securities and, in January, will resume rolling over maturing Treasury 
securities at auction. Taken together, these actions should maintain downward pressure on 
longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial 
conditions more accommodative. 
The Committee will closely monitor incoming information on economic and financial 
developments in coming months. If the outlook for the labor market does not improve 
substantially, the Committee will continue its purchases of Treasury and agency mortgage-
backed securities, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate, until such improvement is 
achieved in a context of price stability. In determining the size, pace, and composition of its asset 
purchases, the Committee will, as always, take appropriate account of the likely efficacy and 
costs of such purchases. 
To support continued progress toward maximum employment and price stability, the Committee 
expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropriate for a 
considerable time after the asset purchase program ends and the economic recovery strengthens. 
In particular, the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 
percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will 
be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation 
between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above 
the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be 
well anchored. The Committee views these thresholds as consistent with its earlier date-based 
guidance. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary 
policy, the Committee will also consider other information, including additional measures of 
labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations, and readings 
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on financial developments. When the Committee decides to begin to remove policy 
accommodation, it will take a balanced approach consistent with its longer-run goals of 
maximum employment and inflation of 2 percent. 
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. 
Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Dennis P. Lockhart; Sandra Pianalto; Jerome H. 
Powell; Sarah Bloom Raskin; Jeremy C. Stein; Daniel K. Tarullo; John C. Williams; and Janet L. 
Yellen. Voting against the action was Jeffrey M. Lacker, who opposed the asset purchase 
program and the characterization of the conditions under which an exceptionally low range for 
the federal funds rate will be appropriate. 
 
 
Sample of Minutes 
January 28, 2004: 
 https://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20040128.htm 
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Sample of Transcripts 
January 28, 2004: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20040128meeting.pdf 
December 12, 2012: 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20121212meeting.pdf 
 
